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Organised labor'sl most critical problem in the twentieth century 
has been how to bring economic and political democracy to workers. 
The extension of democracy for workers, however, cannot be 
separated from the problem of democracy and human rights for 
society as a whole. At various times, the needs of the general society 
have been far more important than just workers' needs, especially 
when countries have been plunged into the terror ofrightwing state-
sanctioned2 violence. 
The two main institutions of organised labor in modem times 
have been trade unions and political parties. Social movements, 
however, have always provided the impetus for major (as opposed 
to incremental) social and political changes that workers' unions and 
parties may have helped initiate. In the first half of the twentieth 
century, virtually every union and political breakthrough for workers 
in industrialising countries involved leftwing3 leaders and 
organisations in some way, even if these initiatives at times were led 
by mainstream unions and labor-oriented parties with moderate 
policies and actions, and with leadership that did not include or only 
marginally included the left. 
While considerable research has been done on the relationship 
between Ieftwing labor and rightwing violence for specific countries, 
beyond the European context this is a generally unexplored subject 
in broad comparative terms.4 Even comparative labor history takes 
us only so far, because all too often the comparison is with regimes 
and labor movements that are relatively similar. This scholarship 
generally separates the "labor world" into Asian and non-Asian 
spheres. 5 Another focus, comparing national industrial relations 
systems or comparing national cultural differences, is not enough 
either, however useful these approaches have been up to the present. 
Works in these particular areas, however, at least begin to connect 
Asian-based and European-based labor, even though they often 
emphasize institutional frameworks to the exclusion of labor 
movements and these movements' interaction with political regimes.6 
We need to go beyond the usual "compare / contrast" framework 
of comparative labor history and work toward a new type of 
methodology, but one that does not necessarily exclude previous 
ones.? As historians and social scientists, we cannot possibly find 
new approaches without building on and giving due recognition to 
earlier accomplishments. Certainly there are significant moves in 
the direction of new "comparative" approaches, perhaps most evident 
in scholarship that has been appearing in the journals International 
Labor and Working-Class History and International Review of Social 
History. Building a connection between comparative historical work 
and broader theoretical possibilities requires a methodology that 
extends much of the work that has been presented in these journals. 
Given the limitations of time and space here, what follows is an 
initial outline, with some hypotheses, of a work in progress. 
the interwar period.9 One common linkage is that each country was 
the economic leader, in terms of GDP growth rates, in its particular 
region (Argentina - southeastern; Australia - southwestern; Japan-
northwestern; United States - northeastern) in the years preceding 
this era. 
Why specific unions and industries? We need to know how 
workers organised at the worksite, or in particular protest settings 
(strikes, rallies, community mobilisations, and so on). It is not enough 
to know the general outcomes or the summaries made by top leaders. 
For example, finding out the actual role ofthe left within a union or 
workplace all too often requires analysis of day to day actions at 
critical moments. \0 The link betweens these union and industrial 
activities to larger political developments is the key to understanding 
common global patterns. Why strategic unions and industries? A 
strategic focus makes the research possible, narrowing the study to 
those unions and industries (1) most important to the particular 
country (examples would include, but not be limited to, mining for 
Australia, meatpacking for Argentina, automobiles for the United 
States, and shipbuilding for Japan); and (2) those most important in 
comparative terms (examples would include, but not be limited to, 
dock workers in Australia and Argentina, steelworkers in the United 
States and Japan, and textile workers in all four countries). 
The problem of "rightwing violence" is crucial for labor history 
during this period for several reasons. First, political changes during 
the interwar period created the explosive environment that led to the 
first truly global war - World War II. Outside of Europe, how did 
changing political regimes and violence associated with them impact 
on the possibilities oflabor movement expansion or contraction, and 
on democracy or repression for the larger society in these countries? 
What role did the labor movement play in counteracting the state's 
negative role where this existed, or in influencing the state to act in 
positive (and nonviolent) ways? Second, how was violence, whether 
from employers, non-employer associations, and / or the state, used 
against the labor movement, and how did the labor movement 
respond? To what extent can this violence be characterised as 
"rightwing." Was the violence directed against labor confined to 
workplace issues (such as widespread police and employer violence 
against C.I.O. union organising efforts in the United States during 
the 1930s; Jl or the police shootings during the Townsville 
Meatworkers strike ofl918-1919 in Australia 12)? Or did the violence 
spread beyond the workplace to engulf the society at large (such as 
Argentina's "La Semana Tnigica" massacres in 1919, directed 
initially against workers but within days against immigrants and Jews 
as well; 13 or the massive police repression against unions, 
intellectuals, and political oppositionists accompanying the rise of 
military influence in 1930s JapanI4)? 
Comparing interwar regimes in these four countries reveals a 
paradox. In economic terms, Australia and Argentina followed similar 
paths of development. In the decades before World War I, both 
countries had very high growth rates, high rates of immigration from 
Europe, and had strong primary sector-based industries (meat and 
meatpacking for Argentina, wool and mining for Australia, for 
I am proposing a new "global" framework for labor history that 
will reveal currently hidden patterns and dynamics of-and questions 
about - labor movements and labor institutions internationally, 
especially in relation to political regimes. My specific subject - to 
be researched in detail in the future - utilises a global framework 
that focuses on specific strategic unions and industries in four 
countries located in four regions of the "Pacific hemisphere"8 
EJ - Argentina, Australia, Japan, and the United States - during 
example). While both were industrialising, they were not doing 
so at the same pace as North America and Western Europe. 
Japan and the United States, on the other hand, were 
industrialised nations during the interwar years, even though the U.S. 
was far ahead in many sectors. By the mid-1930s, however, they 
were equals in a few strategic industries such as shipbuilding. The 
U.S. had a strong primary sector, but its manufacturing capability 
became the most important strategic part ofits economy by this time. 
Japan's weak primary sector forced it to concentrate on manufacturing 
capacity in order to successfully compete with Western powers. 
Politically, however, the United States and Australia had far more 
in common with each other than they did with either Japan or 
Argentina. Both had elected systems of government, with complete 
civilian oversight of the military. In contrast, Japan had an unstable 
parliamentary system without sufficient control over the country's 
army and navy, who saw themselves as owing primary loyalty to the 
Japanese emperor. Argentina's military also did not view itself as 
subject solely to civilian elected authority. In 1930, the Argentine 
military overthrew the (liberal) Radical Party government of 
Y rigoyen, remaining in power for over a decade, even though nominal 
and corrupt elections of civilians were held until it assumed total 
control from 1943 to 1945.'5 Japan experienced a more gradual 
military "coup", first evident in 1931 when the Kwangtung Army in 
China defied Prime Minister Inukai by invading and occupying all 
of Manchuria, followed by numerous assassination attempts against 
leading elected officials in Japan. After Army officers finally 
assassinated Inukai in 1932, the military had virtual independence 
from and veto power over any civilian government. 16 
Violence against labor in Japan and Argentina during the 1930s 
must take full consideration of these political developments and the 
unique role of the military. In contrast, violence against labor in 
Australia and the United States was overwhelmingly the product of 
local police and locally elected or appointed officials, rather than 
the national or state governments. Australian workers in particular 
were least subjected to violence. On the other hand, workers in certain 
regions and industries in both the United States and Australia 
experienced a disproportionate level of violence. Trying to organise 
U.S. Southern workers during this entire period did not differ much 
from attempting to unionise Japanese workers generally, because of 
the complete disregard for law and human rights by Southern 
government authorities and employers. 
Levels of violence, then, need to be categorised. Low levels 
involved temporary arrests and the application of standard (rather 
than extraordinary) legal prohibitions. This type of violence was often 
more psychological than physical. When Australian workers and 
unions were subjected to any form of violence during this period it 
rarely if ever went beyond this level, in large part because of the 
institutional and legal protections of the compulsory arbitration 
system and the political power ofthe Australian Labor Party (A.L.P.). 
American workers and unions often faced more severe forms of 
violence until the end of the 1930s when the National Labor Relations 
Act (N.L.R.A.) and positive court rulings backing up the Act began 
to have a moderating effect on many employers and local government 
officials. By the 1930s, the generally pro-labor administration of 
President Franklin D. Roosevelt and widespread labor influence in a 
revitalised Democratic Party at local, state, and national levels further 
assisted labor's advance. I? 
Medium levels of violence involved police attacks, including 
beatings and nonlethal shootings; long-term arrests; severe legal 
restrictions on activities; outright bans on labor activity and 
organisation bans; surveillance and use of agents provocateurs; and 
mobilisation of rightwing mobs. Throughout most of the interwar 
period, this level of violence directed against labor was common in 
many parts of the United States. The consolidation of union 
power and legitimacy during World War II, with the full support 
of the Roosevelt administration, put an end to much of this 
violence directed at labor, except in the South, which was a region 
with laws and mores quite different from much of the rest of the 
United States. Violence against labor in the South, too, cannot be 
understood unless it is seen in relation to racial segregation and 
violence against African Americans, something endorsed by virtually 
every leading government official in that region until the advances 
won by the civil rights movement in the 1950s and 1960s. In the 
American South, the cause of a multiracial labor movement has 
always been directly tied to the fate of African Americans as a whole. IS 
In Japan, on the other hand, authorities relied heavily on police 
with wide discretionary powers to enforce a "medium" level of 
violence against workers, unions, and leftwing political parties. As 
enforcers of political orthodoxy, these Japanese authorities tended 
to focus mainly on leftwing union and political organisations, while 
not harassing more moderate (and eventually conservative) union 
formations, such as the Sodomei labor federation. 19 Argentine 
authorities were not as extreme as their Japanese counterparts, 
especially in the 1920s after the 1919-22 strike wave and before 
military rule that commenced in 1930.20 Both the Japanese and 
Argentine cases, however, reveal another dynamic behind interwar 
labor movements: nationalist anti-left unions emerged by the late 
1930s that supplanted the power of the leftwing organisations. In 
Japan this policy was ruthlessly pursued through state actions and 
dissolution of existing independent unions. In Argentina, on the other 
hand, a populist labor movement emerged that eventually became 
the base of Juan Peron, a former military officer who turned on the 
military authorities and later retained the presidency through 
legitimate elections.21 
High levels of violence against labor have included killings, either 
as individual assassinations or mass killings; mass arrests without 
due process; widespread attacks on working class communities; total 
bans on any labor activities, punishable by arrest, physical abuse 
(torture), and killing; rightwing mobilisation of mobs to carrying 
out lethal attacks; use of the military in addition to the police; and 
the elimination of all legal rights. Japanese labor seems to have been 
most subjected to these extreme forms of violence, in contrast to 
Australian labor during this time which rarely if ever experienced 
this level of abuse. The problem for understanding violence against 
labor in Japan, however, is that we don't know in detail the exact 
extent of it. When some one thousand trade unionists and intellectuals 
were arrested en masse after passage of the Universal Manhood 
Suffrage Act in 1926 (but preceded by earlier police powers as well), 
what happened to them while incarcerated?22 How did this affect 
families, other organisers, and the labor organisations themselves? 
The same could be said for the late 1930s, when independent trade 
unions were disbanded by the state and the government-run Sanpo 
labor organisation replaced them. These type of questions are readily 
asked when we confront the contemporary realities oflabor activists 
in China, South Korea, or Indonesia, but labor historians have not 
addressed these issues as directly when discussing the Japanese 
movement during the interwar periodY 
Overall, patterns of violence against labor have been uneven, 
making it difficult to draw national generalisations for the whole 
period. For all four countries, levels of violence need to be considered 
in terms of (I) specific unions, especially those tied to the left; (2) 
specific political organisations and parties; (3) specific industrial 
sectors and workers within them; (4) specific regions or locales, 
especially those more likely to experience violence against labor; 
(5) years within the interwar period (the 1920s, for example, appear 
less violent in Japan under "Taisho Democracy" and Argentina under 
the elected Radical Party governments than the military-
dominated decade of the 1930s); (6) general popular support 
for or opposition to labor repression / labor advancement. 
-
One peculiar part of the puzzle, when considering the labor 
movement in all four countries, is the failure of the labor movement 
politically in Australia and in trade union terms in Argentina and 
Japan during the 1930s, in contrast to the labor movement's 
spectacular union organising and political alliance-building successes 
in the United States during this decade. Part of the solution may be 
to compare union densities and activity in each country during this 
decade, because these highlight the centrality of political regimes in 
determining the relative strength or weakness of the labor movement. 
All four countries suffered from the worldwide depression. At 
the national level, both Japan and the United States introduced major 
government spending programs, including substantial military-
related projects. Japan preceded the U.S. in major military spending 
during the 1930s, but President Franklin D. Roosevelt soon brought 
the U.S. into a competitive position in this area, with naval 
shipbuilding initially leading the way, and later superseded by military 
aircraft production by the late 1930s.24 Japanese trade union 
membership climbed during the 1930s, but did so at a very slow 
pace and never approached the American figure. Economic conditions 
and Keynesian-type government spending therefore do not explain 
union expansion or contraction. 
The evidence points to political rather than economic factors as 
the driving force behind labor strength. Japan's union density was 
only 8 percent of the industrial workforce in its prewar peak (1936), 
with union membership in all sectors totalling 420,000. During World 
War II, union membership in unions not controlled by the dropped 
to zero.25 In 1946, one year after the end of World War II and 
authoritarian government, Japan's union density reached 41 percent, 
with 4,926,000 union members, a dramatic statement about the role 
of political regimes in hindering or assistance the labor movement.26 
In contrast, U.S. union density in 1930, one of the lowest points for 
membership in the first half of the twentieth century, was just 11.6 
percent of nonagricultural workers. President Herbert Hoover and a 
Republican-controlled Congress pushed through "balanced budgets," 
refused to fund any government relief for the unemployed, and 
promoted the interests of big business at the expense oflabor. Eight 
years later (1938), union membership had risen to 27.5 percent, and 
by 1945 had reached an all-time high of35.5 percent. 27 This growth 
occurred under President Roosevelt's pro-labor Democratic 
administration, which carried out government spending policies that 
paralleled those of the Japanese governments of the same years. 
Argentina's historical level of union strength is more difficult to 
assess because much of the literature does not even address the 
question of union density.28 Strike activity, however, can be used as 
an alternative indicator. Argentina's biggest strike wave before the 
1940s occurred between 1919 and 1922. In Buenos Aires alone, which 
would have been the main, but not only, centre of labor activity, 
there were 367 strikes with 308,967 workers participating. By 1923, 
the labor movement had been contained, with only 4,737 workers 
joining in 114 strikes in the city.29 Nationally, Shipley calculates that 
19,181 workers took part in 93 strikes (a figure at odds with the 
larger number of strikes in Buenos Aires, which is an indicator of 
the lack of accuracy in strike statistics for Argentina's interwar period. 
By 1928, strikes rose to 135, with 73,918 strikers, and then fell to 
127 strikes, with 38, 505 strikers, in 1930, the year of the military 
coup d' etat. 30 During the 1930s, unions stagnated, with only 43 strikes 
and 4,622 strikers in 1931, and 105 strikes with 34,562 strikers in 
1932.3' Labor had virtually no power politically and had been 
weakened in terms of trade union membership and impact. Its fortunes 
would not be reversed until the early 1940s, when meatpackers, 
workers from the nation's leading industrial sector, united 
behind Juan Peron to forge a new labor populism that would 
overthrow military and conservative control of the 
government. Again, the political regime would make the difference. 
As Berquist notes, the predominance of a moderate and ineffective 
labor federation, the Confederacion General de Trabajadores (C.G.T.) 
stifled a mil itant response to repressive government measures against 
labor.32 
This pattern also occurred in Japan, where the moderate and 
increasingly conservative and anticommunist Sodomei federation 
of unions tried to accommodate the rightwing governments of the 
1930s. As in Argentina, communist-led unions were targeted and 
suppressed by the government. Large argues that Sodomei also was 
accepted by many Japanese workers, especially with the rise of 
ultranationalism in support of Japanese aggression against China. 
Ultranationalism, however, can spread more easily when police are 
actively used to repress and terrorise those who oppose it, especially 
in working class movements. 
In the United States, the union movement shifted to the left during 
these years, but never became a socialist-oriented labor movement. 
The industrial unions that split away from the American Federation 
of Labor (A.F.L.) to form what eventually became the Congress of 
Industrial Organisations (C.I.O.) were led by John L. Lewis, head of 
the United Mine Workers (U.M.W.), a man who had become 
notorious in his own union for his authoritarianism and use of thugs 
to deliver discipline to his factional enemies. When Lewis assumed 
leadership of the C.I.O., however, he changed into a different person, 
hiring socialists and communists as advisers and organisers because 
he knew they would work the hardest and produce the best results. 
Leftwing socialists led C.I.O. unions in auto, shipbuilding, and men's 
clothing, while communists came to lead C.I.O. unions in longshore 
(dock workers), electrical production, metal mining and smelting, 
and meatpacking. The most important organising breakthroughs of 
the decade - on the San Francisco docks in 1934 and the Flint GM 
sitdown of 1937 - were led by communists like Harry Bridges (who 
always denied his affiliation) and men like Wyndham Mortimer (who 
didn't deny it). Only very late in the 1930s did the C.I.O. begin to 
accommodate the mainstream Democratic Party, and in the process 
move to the right. Attacks on communists, however, did not become 
a major feature of the union movement until the mid- to late-1940s, 
when the political barrage from anti-union Republicans in Congress 
grew. By the late 1940s, the RepUblicans controlled Congress, even 
though Democrat Harry S. Truman was president, and this change 
made it possible for a full-scale legislative and investigative assault 
on the labor movement, especially its leftwing. In response, the C.I.O. 
unions expelled those unions who had communists among their 
leadership, and moved more and more to the right. As this happened, 
mainstream unions lost the possibility of political independence and 
a genuine voice on behalf of the working class, and instead became 
little more than advocates for improved workplace conditions.33 
In Argentina and Japan during the interwar period, leftwing labor 
led by anarchists, syndicalists, and finally communists had been 
unable to make longterm headway, either in trade union or political 
terms, in large part because of the sharp rise of rightwing state-
sponsored violence during the 1930s. In the United States, a pro-
labor administration at the federal government level assisted the 
advancement of a new industrial union movement that included 
significant numbers of leftwing leaders and organisers. This 
administration and its Democratic majority in Congress also acted 
to restrict rightwing violence against labor, whether this violence 
came from local government officials and police or from employers, 
by instituting reform legislation and agencies that would provide 
alternatives to strikes and that would guarantee workers' rights to 
organise. 
Australia appears to be quite different than these other 
three countries. In Australia, union density was among the 
highest in the world, reaching 53.3 percent by 1920. Membership 
rose to 56 percent by 1929, then feU to a low of 42.6 percent in 
1934, still far above any of the other three countries for any time in 
their history. Ten years later, in 1944, membership had rebounded to 
54.2 percent and remained in this general percentage for three and a 
half decades.34 The difference between Australia and these other 
countries, in terms of trade union security, has been the compulsory 
arbitration system and the requirement that unions are registered by 
the state (rather than chosen by workers and / or agreed to by 
employers) under this system. Australia's political regimes, until very 
recently, have accepted this system since it began in the early part of 
the twentieth century, thereby creating a protective waU (through 
the industrial courts and legal precedents) around trade unions. 
Further supporting the advance of labor has been the Australian 
Labor Party, which has acted on behalf of trade union interests, but 
has also provided an integral political linked for unions. This labor 
strength, however, has not been leftwing in character, however 
progressive numerous reforms over the century have been. The 
A.L.P. 's laborism has been at the expense of leftwing labor and a 
socialist agenda. In times past it has also supported racism and 
imperialism at the expense of working class internationalism. 
At the same time, leftwing activists have been at the core of 
Australian labor's advance. The conscience of Australian labor has 
more often come from its leftwing unions, such as the Waterside 
Workers Federation (opposing World War I conscription promoted 
by a Labor government) and the Miners' Federation (opposing 
postwar austerity under a Labor government). The ideals and direct 
action practices of the Australian branch of the LW. W. (International 
Workers of the World) have also inspired rank-and-file activists in 
many conservative unions, including the powerful Australian Workers 
Union (A.W.U.).35 The Australian movement seemed to have every 
advantage in the interwar period, compared to the labor movements 
in Japan, Argentina, and even the United States. Union density was 
high, far higher than even the United States in the 1930s, labor had 
its own political party and had held power at both the state and federal 
levels, and rightwing violence against labor was at one of the lowest 
levels in the entire world. 
Why, then, did the Australian labor movement fail to advance in 
union terms - at least nationally - during the Great Depression? 
Why did its political wing fail to retain national power under the 
Scullin Labor government, and why did Labor not return to national 
power again until World War II? When we look only at Australia, 
the answer to these questions may appear straightforward - the power 
of the Bank of England over Australia's national loan repayments 
and implications for budget deficits; the initial split in the A.L.P. 's 
ranks, led by Lang; betrayal by Treasurer Joe Lyons and the creation 
of the United Australia Party; Scullins's general lack ofleadership; 
and so on. The solution is not so obvious, however, when viewed 
from a comparative - and especially global - perspective: why did 
Australian labor fail at such a critical moment when so much seemed 
to be in its favour? 
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